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## CONTENTS

JORDAN: The fedayeen seem to be withdrawing from Amman, but the situation in the north is less clear. (Page 1)

EGYPT: Succession maneuvering continues. (Page 3)

CAMBODIA: The lull in major fighting continues. (Page 5)

USSR: Brezhnev has endorsed the new Vietnamese Communist peace proposals and commented on the Middle East. (Page 6)

EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: The Six continue to express concern about the Mills Bill. (Page 8)

ROMANIA-USSR: New treaty (Page 9)

UGANDA: Armed forces commander detained (Page 9)

ECUADOR: Antigovernment violence likely (Page 10)

25X1

SECRET

**C** JORDAN: The fedayeen seem to be withdrawing from Amman, but the situation in the north is less clear.

25X1  
The three-man follow-up committee announced yesterday that fedayeen and army troops had "almost finished" their withdrawal from Amman. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
Although large numbers of fedayeen are almost certainly doffing their uniforms and merging with the local population, the fact that they are no longer openly challenging the King's authority is something of a victory for the regime. [At least some fedayeen are actually leaving town; local observers have reported seeing fedayeen and their weapons being loaded into trucks in various parts of Amman and transported to relocation centers.]

25X1

[REDACTED]  
There is little word on the progress of the agreement in the north, however. The chairman of the military committee has stated that Ramtha is calm, and that fighting was supposed to end in Irbid and other Jordanian towns yesterday--suggesting that a hitch may have developed in the application of the agreement to Irbid, where some of the more radical fedayeen elements have taken refuge. ]

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
Some fedayeen groups are reported to believe that Yasir Arafat sold out the commando movement in working out the Cairo agreement with King Husayn. Before his departure for Cairo, Arafat was said to have met with the representatives of five fedayeen groups and to have agreed to work solely for a cease-fire, not for a more far-reaching solution. When the agreement was announced, most commando groups suspected that Arafat and the King had been reconciled. The King had been under heavy pressure from Arab opinion before the agreement and afterwards seemed to have regained his position in the Arab world; the extremist fedayeen groups, in particular, vociferously opposed the agreement, despite Arafat's efforts to justify his acceptance.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)--the group responsible for the airline hijackings--is particularly likely to thumb its nose at a compromise settlement, and may well be planning further escapades. Although the hostages it held were released without conditions, an Egyptian diplomat has given Red Cross representatives a list of Arab prisoners held by the Israelis whose release is said to be necessary to avoid further hijackings and "other measures."

25X1

25X1

25X1



3 Oct 70

Central Intelligence Bulletin

2

SECRET

SECRET

**Egypt:** [Maneuvering for a successor to Nasir is continuing in Cairo.]

[Press reports of heart attacks suffered by acting President Sadat and former vice president Ali Sabri on Thursday appear to be at least partly the product of the power struggle that is getting under way. Although both Sadat and Sabri may have been affected by the strains of Nasir's funeral, and both do have histories of heart trouble, they recovered too rapidly to have suffered true heart attacks, and carried on with business as usual yesterday.]

[The Al-Ahram story of their heart attacks may in fact have been intended as an attempt to show that neither Sadat or Sabri is fit enough to carry on Nasir's work. The editor in chief of the newspaper, Muhammad Haykal, who is also a minister of state, appears to favor former vice president Zakariya Muhyeddin as Nasir's successor, and probably hoped to improve his chances by this maneuver.]

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## Current Situation



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CAMBODIA: [The lull in major fighting continues although the Communists are maintaining pressure against government positions along the primary Cambodian roadways. A Cambodian Army artillery position and a nearby armored group stationed at Sre Khlong on Route 4, 15 miles southwest of Kompong Speu, were attacked early on 2 October; friendly casualties were light. The Communists also made several harassing attacks on the government column halted on Route 6, and reports from the task force claim that sizable numbers of enemy troops are positioned just three miles from its eastern flank. Such daily harassments are typical and serve to keep the government on the defensive. The tactic also enables the Communists to control traffic or even to close portions of some of the major highways, increasing Phnom Penh's isolation from the countryside.]

[Thai Aid] [REDACTED]

[The Thais apparently intend to provide further military assistance to Cambodia despite their lingering dismay over Phnom Penh's rejection of the Thai-Khmer volunteer force.]

25X1

3 Oct 70

Central Intelligence Bulletin

5

SECRET

SECRET

USSR: Soviet party chief Brezhnev's endorsement of the new Vietnamese Communist peace proposals and tough comments on the Middle East situation highlighted his foreign policy statements in Baku yesterday.

Brezhnev's nationally telecast speech contained no surprising departures but gave an authoritative endorsement to themes already evident in Soviet policy. His remarks, apart from those on the Middle East, had the same overall tone of self-satisfaction present in his foreign policy speech five weeks ago in Alma Ata, although he adopted a less conciliatory posture toward the West.

Brezhnev praised the new Communist negotiating proposals in Paris as containing "a good and fair basis for ending the war and establishing a coalition government." He added that they had the "full approval and understanding of the Soviet government." He tried to put the onus on Washington for the next step, claiming that if the US "displays reason, a political settlement in Vietnam might make headway." Brezhnev's remarks gave no indication, however, that the Soviets actually think that the new proposals will break the log jam in Paris.

The Soviet party chief struck an unusually defensive note in discussing the Soviet - West German treaty. He defended it against unnamed critics "here and there" as an even-handed agreement from which "all have gained equally." His remarks seem aimed primarily at lending indirect support to the Bonn government's attempts to counter domestic opposition to the treaty. Brezhnev may also have intended these comments for the ear of East German critics, and perhaps also for those Soviets who retain misgivings. Although Brezhnev had voiced an intent earlier in his talks to avoid "repeating the same things" he has said in recent speeches, he reiterated his appeal of just five weeks ago for the pact's ratification.

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Brezhnev's comments on the Middle East were harsher than any by a Soviet leader in some time. He extolled the efforts of the Soviet Union to end the civil war in Jordan, which he claimed had inflicted "no small harm" on the Arab cause, but warned that "any foreign intervention in the events in Jordan is absolutely inadmissible"--a declaration seemingly aimed as much at Syria as at Israel and the US. Brezhnev warned that in the event of a new "imperialist" intervention in the Middle East "one could not only burn one's fingers, but--who knows--even lose an arm."

Brezhnev tried to rebut US complaints of cease-fire violations along the Suez Canal, characterizing the charges as an effort to frustrate peace negotiations "behind a smokescreen of invented accusations against the UAR." He also scored US support for Israel, condemning with special vigor "new consignments of offensive arms." Brezhnev eulogized Nasir at some length, and expressed the hope that his successors will continue his policies.

Brezhnev's strong endorsement of the UN provided another indication of Moscow's assessment that the Soviet international position is improving. Brezhnev noted that UN actions reflect "the balance of power between world states" and implied that the socialist states and other like-minded countries will increasingly be able to influence UN policies.

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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: [The Six continue to express great concern about the Mills Bill.]

[In a communiqué issued at the EC Council meeting last Tuesday, the Communities said that they consider the pending US trade legislation to have created a "very serious" situation that must be followed attentively. If the Mills Bill becomes law, the communiqué stated, the EC "will not fail to assert its rights." In addition, however, the Council instructed a committee to search for constructive solutions to the problems the legislation poses, not just forms of retaliation.]

[The Mills Bill offers the Communities an opportunity to return in kind the sort of criticism the US has for some time been making against the EC's restrictions on farm imports and its preferential trade agreements with other countries. For example, at a meeting of the Council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) this week, the US stated its opposition to all such agreements that are inconsistent with GATT and said it may lodge a formal complaint.]

[The Mills Bill, preferences, and other trade problems will be discussed on 15 and 16 October when EC Commissioner Dahrendorf visits Washington. The EC, US, UK, and Japan may meet a second time in Geneva after that. The EC Council, however, has postponed a decision on whether such talks are desirable until it can assess the results of Dahrendorf's visit.]

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ROMANIA-USSR: Bucharest and Moscow simultaneously ratified the new treaty of friendship, co-operation, and mutual assistance on 30 September. Speeches made on the occasion by Romanian leader Ceausescu and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko illustrated the differing emphases the two sides give to the key clauses of the treaty. The statements were not antagonistic, and reflected the improved atmosphere in relations between Moscow and Bucharest since the treaty was signed on 7 July. On 1 October the East Germans announced that Foreign Minister Otto Winzer had concluded their first mutual assistance treaty with Romania. Since the Soviet treaty was signed, the Poles and Romanians have also initialed a new bilateral pact, and the Bulgarians and Romanians have agreed to sign their treaty in November.

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UGANDA: President Milton Obote has eliminated a threat to his position by detaining the armed forces commander. In a well-planned series of moves, Obote not only placed Major General Idi Amin in detention, but also sought to prevent any serious trouble by arresting some of the general's supporters and disbanding a unit loyal only to the commander. The general's alleged involvement in the murder of another high-ranking officer last January may be used to justify the detention but Obote was probably eager for an excuse to be rid of Amin, who was becoming increasingly active in politics.

25X1

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3 Oct 70

*Central Intelligence Bulletin*

9

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SECRET

ECUADOR: Antigovernment violence is likely next week in Guayaquil, the commercial center of Ecuador, following the arbitrary dismissal of the city's mayor and the prefect of the province. Celebrations to mark the city's 150th anniversary are scheduled to begin this weekend. Demonstrations against the central government's removal of these two popularly elected representatives could occur at that time. The reaction of the regime to criticism by these two regional politicians has catapulted them into national prominence and may coalesce political opponents of the regime who have largely acquiesced in the 22 June takeover of dictatorial power by President Velasco.

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